If you build it ... they still won't come

Part VII - The Myth of Scarcity

by Kurt Misar

Hunden Partners has advised the city that two public performing arts auditoriums in Portland are not economically feasible and therefore the Keller Auditorium should be demolished and a new one built by Portland State University.

The problem with the Hunden report is not merely its conclusion, but the framing used to reach it. The document repeatedly presents possibility as probability, amplifies speculative risks and minimizes contradictions within its own market assumptions. Its language reveals a pattern:
Worst-case scenarios are emphasized, competitive realities are deferred, and renovation is quietly dismissed in favor of replacement.

It becomes difficult to wade through the joint city and PSU press release rhetoric without encountering statements that overreach or misdirect:

“Its (Keller Auditorium) closure could prevent performances from Broadway Across America for years and cause local arts organizations to face significant challenges without a large-scale performing venue. Portland State University’s proposed facility would be headlined by a 3,000-seat venue, capable of large-scale performances, but could hinder the long-term feasibility of the Portland’5 venues, particularly as two new live entertainment facilities from AEG and Live Nation are to be opened in the coming years.”

These claims deserve careful parsing.

First, the suggestion that closure “could prevent performances … for years” implies permanence. A retrofit interruption might last two years. It also assumes that BAA would not relocate temporarily to the Schnitzer or to one of the two new private 3,000-plus-seat venues opening within the next year. An interruption of venue does not equal its disappearance.

Second, the study warns of “significant challenges without a large-scale performing venue.” Yet by summer 2026, there will be at least two 3,000-seat venues, and by early 2027, three. That reality contradicts the report’s assertion that the region cannot financially sustain two such facilities. With a Keller retrofit, Portland would have four. If PSU were added, five. The contradiction is self-evident.

Third, the study concedes that a new PSU theater “could hinder the long-term feasibility of the Portland’5 venues.” On that point, the authors are refreshingly candid. Additional stage supply fragments the already finite demand. The report recognizes this, ignores it, dismisses it and yet still recommends building another venue.

Fourth, the competitive impact of AEG and Live Nation is framed as something occurring “in the coming years,” when in fact those facilities will be operating well before any Keller retrofit or PSU project breaks ground. The market effects will be immediate, not hypothetical.

The study’s most pointed claims appear in these summary bullet arguments:

• “(Keller is a) …very wide auditorium that creates many limited view seats, and it features outdated amenities, lowering customer experience.” (“Many” is asserted without quantification, and no evidence is offered to demonstrate sales deterrence. Limited sightlines and dated amenities are conditions that can be addressed in renovation. They are not proof of terminal decline.)

• “A multi-year closure of Keller risks eroding Portland’s Broadway Across America audience and forcing skilled labor to relocate from Portland to other cities.” (Risk does not equal inevitability. Audience erosion presumes no temporary relocation strategy and no substitution venue. Skilled labor displacement is assumed despite two major private venues under construction and announcing substantial hiring.)

• “Private competition from new commercial venues could also siphon concerts and events from the Keller, which creates an additional commercial demand reduction if there were to be two large theater-style venues.” (By early 2027, there will be at least three such venues regardless of Keller’s fate.)

• “New venues in other markets have resulted in sustained audience and subscription growth, higher customer satisfaction and improved production capability.” (Even if true elsewhere, that does not justify demolition here. Nor does it establish that modernization is equivalent to a new structure.)

Notice how frequently “possibility” is presented as “certain probability,” and how often conjecture substitutes for evidence.

Meanwhile, the study asserts that the greater Portland market cannot support two large venues like the Keller. Yet the city proposes constructing another 3,000-seat facility rather than renovating the one it owns. In a finite market, adding supply further fragments revenue streams.

For example, Portland Opera Association has recently paused moving forward with a new season, seeking $500,000 in underwriting before proceeding. That is not a venue problem. It is a demand and cost-balance problem. The city is aware of these financial stresses, yet frames the discussion primarily around preserving access to the most expensive house in town.

We do not need more theaters. We need to ensure the long-term value of the ones we already possess. Whether government—or my own industry—has the skills and discipline to do that remains uncertain.

The full study is available on the city’s website. Make your own assessments and comment below so we can address them.

This is the last installment in the series. Read them all on this site.

Part II - Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall

Part III - Newmark Theater

Part IV - Winningstad and Brunish theaters

Part V – Live Nation and AEG

Part VI – The Finite Market Problem

Part VII - The Myth of Scarcity

Kurt Misar is a part-time theater artist who has worked in banking, commercial real estate management and development, commercial leasing and residential sales. He is an associate broker with Capstone Real Estate Services and a resident of Goose Hollow.