Setting the Record Straight on the Montgomery Park Streetcar Extension
Matt Zmuda's recent response to my critique of the Montgomery Park streetcar extension mischaracterizes my arguments while glossing over the project's fundamental problems. Let me address his points directly.
On Fungibility: Only Half the Story
Zmuda correctly notes that federal transit capital grants under 49 U.S.C. § 5309 cannot be redirected to street maintenance. I am well aware of that and never claimed otherwise. What he omits is that the local match—20% to 50% of the project cost—is entirely fungible.
Depending on a federal grant award—hardly assured under a motor vehicle-centric Trump administration—that means $38 million to $95 million in city-controlled funds must be raised locally through LIDs, general revenues, or other sources.
Against that backdrop, PBOT’s refusal to spend even $500,000—less than 1% of the low-end local contribution—to temporarily repair NW 23rd is indefensible.
NW 23rd, including its hazardous crosswalks, has been in deplorable condition for over a decade. This deterioration predates the streetcar proposal and should not be held hostage to an unfunded project that may not break ground for years, if ever. We should not have to wait for a lawsuit—after an elderly or visually impaired person is injured in a potholed crosswalk—before the city acts.
The Development Has Collapsed—and So Have the Ridership Assumptions
Zmuda leans on a familiar narrative: build the infrastructure and development will follow. Sometimes that has been true. But history does not override present-day facts.
The development used to justify this extension has collapsed:
• Montgomery Park sold for 13% of its former value
• The promised 2,000 housing units vanished
• The 23-acre ESCO site has sat vacant for seven years
• No developer has stepped forward with financing or plans
Yet PBOT and Portland Streetcar continue to rely on unchanged ridership projections, justifying them by pointing to “adopted zoning”—as though zoning itself generates riders.
This is not prudent planning based on future property values. It is building expensive infrastructure for a development that does not exist and pretending the numbers still work.
Equally telling is PBOT’s refusal to clearly define the Local Improvement District boundary. The reason is obvious: to make the financing pencil out, the LID must sweep in property owners who already have decent transit access via bus lines and the existing streetcar—and who would receive little or no marginal benefit from this extension.
Portland’s Streetcar History Is Being Selectively Remembered
Zmuda invokes early streetcar projects and the Pearl District to suggest today’s objections are shortsighted. What he omits is who bore the risk.
Historically, streetcar extensions outside the Pearl District were privately financed by property owners and developers who owned the land and stood to profit directly:
• Alameda’s developers financed their own extension
• Laurelhurst’s backers built transit to market their property
• Risk and reward were aligned
By contrast, PBOT’s current proposal asks existing homeowners and small businesses to subsidize infrastructure intended to benefit speculative future developers who have not committed capital, secured financing, or even demonstrated interest.
That is not continuity with Portland’s past—it is a departure from it.
The Pearl District worked because land assembly was real, financing existed, development followed quickly, and property owners knowingly taxed themselves. None of those conditions apply here.
“Accountability” Without Transparency Is Not Accountability
Zmuda argues that Local Improvement Districts provide accountability because property owners can stop the project. That claim is dubious. Once a project enters construction, it is exceedingly difficult for individual property owners to halt it. The meaningful opportunities for objection occur earlier—opportunities PBOT has undermined by refusing to define LID boundaries or engage the community honestly.
Property owners are being asked to support a project with a $292 million-per-mile price tag, open-ended cost exposure, and planning assumptions untethered from current market realities. That is not shared risk; it is asymmetric risk.
This Is Ultimately About Trust—and PBOT Has Not Earned It
Zmuda concludes that opposition to the streetcar reflects a broader lack of trust in Portland’s governance. On that point, he is right—though not in the way he intends.
When PBOT allows a major commercial corridor to deteriorate for years, dismisses modest interim fixes, clings to outdated projections, and avoids clarity about who pays and who benefits, skepticism is not reactionary. It is rational.
Not every great Portland neighborhood began as a “streetcar to nowhere.” They began with developers bearing risk, financing grounded in reality, transparent costs, and basic infrastructure that was actually maintained.
Portland became a model city through calculated risks backed by real market conditions and private capital. This project offers neither. Until PBOT can answer basic questions—Who pays? Who benefits? What happens when costs rise?—and until actual development materializes rather than theoretical zoning capacity, this extension remains what I called it: a streetcar to nowhere.
In the meantime, NW 23rd deserves the maintenance it should have received a decade ago.
Pretty accurate summary. One thing I would have added is South Waterfront. The extension of the streetcar there was beneficial to that district's growth too. (A full-fledged grocery store so people living in the thousand of units there don;t have to use the streetcar or drive to go shopping is probably the biggest detriment to even bigger success..but that's a whole other issue.). I think the jury may still be out on the street car extension to Lloyd, Convention Center and OSMI districts.
I don’t know where you get this from, David. The light rail project was a key factor, the last nail, as it were, in the demise of the area surrounding SW 1st and Oak. Where are the galleries, where are the restaurants? Why is Waterfront Park dangerous? Light rail was an unmitigated disaster for downtown.
To deny this, as both you and Mr. Zmuda do, is all the more reason to kill this project. Some of Zmuda’s other claims like funding fungibility are spot on. ‘Spend it while you got it’, alas, is also true. We can’t spend it elsewhere? Then return it. Be good stewards. I don’t intend to demean, but lecturing on the history for those of us who were here does not go down well.
A) The discussion is around Portland Streetcar, not MAX and B) there's a lot of blame to go around for downtown. MAX is not the most significant. Downtown was thriving and healthy until maybe 2020. MAX opened almost 40 years ago in 1986 with significant extensions in the 90s, 00s and 10s. Up until 2020 the biggest problem the city had (from the perspective of people living here) was that it was growing too fast, old stuff was being knocked down, and it was getting too expensive. . Light Rail kept downtown going for decades. But none of that goes back to the streetcar discussion
Streetcar, Light Rail, let's call the whole thing off.
To say that the area just south of Burnside was 'thriving' until 2020 is blatantly false. The construction destroyed foot traffic to the area that, in turn, destroyed the galleries and restaurans. They shuttered and never returned. This allowed the conditions on Burnside to move in. That part of the city is DEAD. To say otherwise is to acknowledge that you have no idea what WAS there, what happened, and what exists today. Putting liptsick on a pig is a no sell for me.
I encourage large active investment in this city. I am pro development. THIS project is wrong. And let's be clear, every major developer eyeing Portland is breathing relief that they were not involved in The Ritz Carlton. 'Build it and they will come 'is a long ways off. Clean up what EXISTS TODAY before speculative investment based on out of line projections and a history of destroying vibrant merchant areas with high volumes of foot traffic . EVERY Merchant in the northern parts of Nob Hill and Slabtown should be up in arms about the prospect given the history of what happened in the past.
Good arguments from Mr. Weinstein and Mr. Zmuda. Speculation is always a risky proposition however the examples of success cited by Mr. Zmuda illustrate private sector speculation based on population trends and private investment. It's a highly questionable undertaking when development speculations are made on the public dime. It has been said that there is a very fine line between vision and folly and right now and for the foreseeable future, Portland appears to be in the latter position.
This is just a superb piece on the relationship between transit and community development. Bob Weinstein's objections do not negate the overall arguments that Mr. Zmuda makes here. I hope that NW Examiner readers will take the time to read the whole article. I really appreciate the time invested in writing it.
It seems dubious to compare a period of Portland history where car ownership was not dominate to a period where it's common for most families to have multiple cars (I'm not a car advocate, I've been carless for over 10 years and a regular user of Tri Met since 1983). I think it's reasonable to conclude the car killed the Trolly/Streetcar and driving is still the main mode of transportation for most Portlanders. I would even assume the number of biker riders exceeds the current number of daily streetcar users. Also, its seems obvious, from an Engineering Economics POV, bus routes are more economical (and flexible) than fixed rail street cars. If the goal is to move people, I find it hard to believe adding Tri Met lines is not faster, cheaper, and more flexible than adding streetcar. I would agree the original streetcar development was a good way to market Portland as a progressive (in a good way) and livable city but not sure adding more rail miles would be of much marketing value. I would also agree many people who would ride a streetcar would NOT ride a bus. A way to boost Portland and streetcar use and support for adding more miles of rail might be to enforce fares on the current streetcar in an attempt to clean it up.
Setting the Record Straight on the Montgomery Park Streetcar Extension
Matt Zmuda's recent response to my critique of the Montgomery Park streetcar extension mischaracterizes my arguments while glossing over the project's fundamental problems. Let me address his points directly.
On Fungibility: Only Half the Story
Zmuda correctly notes that federal transit capital grants under 49 U.S.C. § 5309 cannot be redirected to street maintenance. I am well aware of that and never claimed otherwise. What he omits is that the local match—20% to 50% of the project cost—is entirely fungible.
Depending on a federal grant award—hardly assured under a motor vehicle-centric Trump administration—that means $38 million to $95 million in city-controlled funds must be raised locally through LIDs, general revenues, or other sources.
Against that backdrop, PBOT’s refusal to spend even $500,000—less than 1% of the low-end local contribution—to temporarily repair NW 23rd is indefensible.
NW 23rd, including its hazardous crosswalks, has been in deplorable condition for over a decade. This deterioration predates the streetcar proposal and should not be held hostage to an unfunded project that may not break ground for years, if ever. We should not have to wait for a lawsuit—after an elderly or visually impaired person is injured in a potholed crosswalk—before the city acts.
The Development Has Collapsed—and So Have the Ridership Assumptions
Zmuda leans on a familiar narrative: build the infrastructure and development will follow. Sometimes that has been true. But history does not override present-day facts.
The development used to justify this extension has collapsed:
• Montgomery Park sold for 13% of its former value
• The promised 2,000 housing units vanished
• The 23-acre ESCO site has sat vacant for seven years
• No developer has stepped forward with financing or plans
Yet PBOT and Portland Streetcar continue to rely on unchanged ridership projections, justifying them by pointing to “adopted zoning”—as though zoning itself generates riders.
This is not prudent planning based on future property values. It is building expensive infrastructure for a development that does not exist and pretending the numbers still work.
Equally telling is PBOT’s refusal to clearly define the Local Improvement District boundary. The reason is obvious: to make the financing pencil out, the LID must sweep in property owners who already have decent transit access via bus lines and the existing streetcar—and who would receive little or no marginal benefit from this extension.
Portland’s Streetcar History Is Being Selectively Remembered
Zmuda invokes early streetcar projects and the Pearl District to suggest today’s objections are shortsighted. What he omits is who bore the risk.
Historically, streetcar extensions outside the Pearl District were privately financed by property owners and developers who owned the land and stood to profit directly:
• Alameda’s developers financed their own extension
• Laurelhurst’s backers built transit to market their property
• Risk and reward were aligned
By contrast, PBOT’s current proposal asks existing homeowners and small businesses to subsidize infrastructure intended to benefit speculative future developers who have not committed capital, secured financing, or even demonstrated interest.
That is not continuity with Portland’s past—it is a departure from it.
The Pearl District worked because land assembly was real, financing existed, development followed quickly, and property owners knowingly taxed themselves. None of those conditions apply here.
“Accountability” Without Transparency Is Not Accountability
Zmuda argues that Local Improvement Districts provide accountability because property owners can stop the project. That claim is dubious. Once a project enters construction, it is exceedingly difficult for individual property owners to halt it. The meaningful opportunities for objection occur earlier—opportunities PBOT has undermined by refusing to define LID boundaries or engage the community honestly.
Property owners are being asked to support a project with a $292 million-per-mile price tag, open-ended cost exposure, and planning assumptions untethered from current market realities. That is not shared risk; it is asymmetric risk.
This Is Ultimately About Trust—and PBOT Has Not Earned It
Zmuda concludes that opposition to the streetcar reflects a broader lack of trust in Portland’s governance. On that point, he is right—though not in the way he intends.
When PBOT allows a major commercial corridor to deteriorate for years, dismisses modest interim fixes, clings to outdated projections, and avoids clarity about who pays and who benefits, skepticism is not reactionary. It is rational.
Not every great Portland neighborhood began as a “streetcar to nowhere.” They began with developers bearing risk, financing grounded in reality, transparent costs, and basic infrastructure that was actually maintained.
Portland became a model city through calculated risks backed by real market conditions and private capital. This project offers neither. Until PBOT can answer basic questions—Who pays? Who benefits? What happens when costs rise?—and until actual development materializes rather than theoretical zoning capacity, this extension remains what I called it: a streetcar to nowhere.
In the meantime, NW 23rd deserves the maintenance it should have received a decade ago.
RIGHT ON BOB!!!
Pretty accurate summary. One thing I would have added is South Waterfront. The extension of the streetcar there was beneficial to that district's growth too. (A full-fledged grocery store so people living in the thousand of units there don;t have to use the streetcar or drive to go shopping is probably the biggest detriment to even bigger success..but that's a whole other issue.). I think the jury may still be out on the street car extension to Lloyd, Convention Center and OSMI districts.
I don’t know where you get this from, David. The light rail project was a key factor, the last nail, as it were, in the demise of the area surrounding SW 1st and Oak. Where are the galleries, where are the restaurants? Why is Waterfront Park dangerous? Light rail was an unmitigated disaster for downtown.
To deny this, as both you and Mr. Zmuda do, is all the more reason to kill this project. Some of Zmuda’s other claims like funding fungibility are spot on. ‘Spend it while you got it’, alas, is also true. We can’t spend it elsewhere? Then return it. Be good stewards. I don’t intend to demean, but lecturing on the history for those of us who were here does not go down well.
A) The discussion is around Portland Streetcar, not MAX and B) there's a lot of blame to go around for downtown. MAX is not the most significant. Downtown was thriving and healthy until maybe 2020. MAX opened almost 40 years ago in 1986 with significant extensions in the 90s, 00s and 10s. Up until 2020 the biggest problem the city had (from the perspective of people living here) was that it was growing too fast, old stuff was being knocked down, and it was getting too expensive. . Light Rail kept downtown going for decades. But none of that goes back to the streetcar discussion
Streetcar, Light Rail, let's call the whole thing off.
To say that the area just south of Burnside was 'thriving' until 2020 is blatantly false. The construction destroyed foot traffic to the area that, in turn, destroyed the galleries and restaurans. They shuttered and never returned. This allowed the conditions on Burnside to move in. That part of the city is DEAD. To say otherwise is to acknowledge that you have no idea what WAS there, what happened, and what exists today. Putting liptsick on a pig is a no sell for me.
I encourage large active investment in this city. I am pro development. THIS project is wrong. And let's be clear, every major developer eyeing Portland is breathing relief that they were not involved in The Ritz Carlton. 'Build it and they will come 'is a long ways off. Clean up what EXISTS TODAY before speculative investment based on out of line projections and a history of destroying vibrant merchant areas with high volumes of foot traffic . EVERY Merchant in the northern parts of Nob Hill and Slabtown should be up in arms about the prospect given the history of what happened in the past.
Good arguments from Mr. Weinstein and Mr. Zmuda. Speculation is always a risky proposition however the examples of success cited by Mr. Zmuda illustrate private sector speculation based on population trends and private investment. It's a highly questionable undertaking when development speculations are made on the public dime. It has been said that there is a very fine line between vision and folly and right now and for the foreseeable future, Portland appears to be in the latter position.
Excellent article, Matt. I learned a lot and feel better about this project going forward.
Well done, Matt. Good arguments. Thoughtful and forward looking. Including the need for governance to actually govern effectively again.
This is just a superb piece on the relationship between transit and community development. Bob Weinstein's objections do not negate the overall arguments that Mr. Zmuda makes here. I hope that NW Examiner readers will take the time to read the whole article. I really appreciate the time invested in writing it.
It seems dubious to compare a period of Portland history where car ownership was not dominate to a period where it's common for most families to have multiple cars (I'm not a car advocate, I've been carless for over 10 years and a regular user of Tri Met since 1983). I think it's reasonable to conclude the car killed the Trolly/Streetcar and driving is still the main mode of transportation for most Portlanders. I would even assume the number of biker riders exceeds the current number of daily streetcar users. Also, its seems obvious, from an Engineering Economics POV, bus routes are more economical (and flexible) than fixed rail street cars. If the goal is to move people, I find it hard to believe adding Tri Met lines is not faster, cheaper, and more flexible than adding streetcar. I would agree the original streetcar development was a good way to market Portland as a progressive (in a good way) and livable city but not sure adding more rail miles would be of much marketing value. I would also agree many people who would ride a streetcar would NOT ride a bus. A way to boost Portland and streetcar use and support for adding more miles of rail might be to enforce fares on the current streetcar in an attempt to clean it up.